Maritime Security Companies Offering Anti-Piracy Services

[Mariner 87]

Interesting forum all! It's good to know that people actually take an interest in whats going on off Somalia.

From personal experience (and that of a number of my colleagues) we have had good experience with Maritime and Underwater Security Consultants (www.mandusc.com).

We had them come and audit several of our vessels, prepare anti-piracy plans and deploy unarmed security teams.

The guys were really good - all knew their ISPS, rules for collision prevention etc as well as piracy which I suspect many forget.

Let's just say, we were glad to have them onboard!!

[seamarshals]

Since the downsizing of private security in Iraq, there have been even more companies joining in the maritime security environment. Competition can be a good thing and forces one to elevate their services and keep pricing competitive. However, in dealing with various maritime companies, we have found that security companies are very quick to offer a quote for services, sometimes without even asking questions beyond the type of vessel. Anytime a quote for services is given, it should be accompanied by a valid risk assessment, preferably by an independent third party. This way, the shipping company has the correct knowledge at hand to make a more informed decision on proposed security, rather than price alone. Every vessel is different and every shipping company has a different acceptable risk level. In addition, the security company should offer their complete proposed method of protection, along with the equipment that is considered mission critical, not just a quote.

[Danny Ellis]

Another one is Secure Crewing: their blurb reads:

SECURE CREWING & PROTECTION SERVICES

(SCS)

Drawing on a reserve of retired naval commandos and naval technical elements the following services are offered for negotiation for hire under contract terms:

VESSELS AT SEA

• Crewing on high seas vessels (commercial and recreational) as able seamen with international certification, embarking all ports worldwide excluding North Korea, Iran, Cuba and Somalia.
• Technical ratings on both commercial and recreational vessels in communications, medical responses.
• Protection of vessel Captain and Crews on the high seas from piracy and attack.

PORT – WHARF – MOORED VESSEL PROTECTION

• Anti stowaway operations: securing moored vessels against stowaway boarding, detection if onboard, removal before embarking.
• Load cargo protection against theft.
• Prevention of illicit contraband (including narcotics) emplacement aboard or on hull.
• Guarding cargo storage areas, gangplank/wharf access zones, personnel movements quayside;

Location: crews are geographically situated on a national territory close to the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) states

Relevant Skill Sets and Training: Based in organizational principles on formal British Royal Navy (RN) standards and methodologies (Seamanship Boards). English is the working language of the crews throughout. RN training standards for seamanship and promotion (Queen’s Standard Training Certificate).

All crews in their naval training make force entry as Ordinary Seamen for six (6) months training and then undergo branch separation. Leading rates (ten years service) qualify in civilian skill: mechanics (generators etc); radio-electrical; armed exercises (platoon weapons), vessel evacuation and life rafting; guarding; Physical Fitness (PI) qualified.

Ratings Ordinary Ratings (2-3 years); Leading ratings (10 – 12 Years).

Their basic induction courses included:

• Diving (snorkel, tank and free lung); (freshwater and salt)
• Demolitions (vessel clearance and sabotage)
• Landing and boarding parties (small group weapons and tactics).
• Radio communications (Ship sets and commando small network/wireless) flag and semaphore: ship-to-ship, ship-to-shore and ship-to-air) (Crypto).
• Repelling borders (close-quarters combat: unarmed and with weaponry).
• Medical (evacuation and casualty treatment and human health maintenance).
• Advanced seamanship and navigation.
• General technical: generators, command & control systems.
• International Law of the Sea; and offshore, afloat and ashore security assessments.

TERMS (minimal set):

• Single seafaring voyage or route agreement of two or more voyages.
• The contractually agreed terms must minimally include a payments regime where:
• One third the agreed total crewing salary be disbursed at commencement of any voyage, the second one-third at mid-voyage and the final third on disembarkation of crew on arrival.
• Costs of medial and life assurance borne by the shipping operator; air transportation to and from embarkation and disembarkation to home country.

CONTACT SCS:

securecrewing@gmail.coom

[seamarshals]

Any security safeguard should be based on a properly conducted risk assessment involving trained security personnel with experience in the domain. Each situation should be weighed on its own with the safeguards ensuring appropriate protection for life, property and operations. Ships are produced in many different configurations and though the transit area may be the same, there are different types of transits. When looking at the different vessels, some have a very high free board, such as the auto carrier type, and some have no free board such as some dredger type vessels. This drastic difference in configuration requires a maximum flexibility in the capabilities of the security provider to construct the proper defensive posture for each type of vessel. In addition to different vessel types are the different kinds of transits. Many vessels travel at a speed between 12 and 18 knots. Some of these vessels have good maneuverability and some very limited. However, one special type of transit that is probably the highest risk type, is the tug and barge towing transit. This transit is especially at risk not only due to a speed capability of about 5 knots, but the fact that the distance between the tug and barge can be from 500 to 700 meters. this configuration gives the total transit length of about 850 meters. Ocean tugs typically have an extreme low freeboard, as well as the barge. The risk assessment is very important as it guides the defensive posture of the transit, but more importantly, the risk assessment gives the vessel owner and operator the knowledge necessary to make informed decisions. There is no "one size fits all" when it comes to vessel protection against piracy.

[Jim Burke]

Just spent the last 3 hours using the Google machine trying to find companies that specialize in piracy suppression or at least deal with it.
I know of Background Risk Solutions in Singapore and thats it.
Can someone shed some light on the various companies that are out there in particular SE Asia.

Thanks

Veteran Government Services (VGS) is a company supporting pre-deployment training (IRAQ/AFGHANISTAN/Western Pacific/HOA) and special operations training featuring a seven week Visit, Board, Search and Seizure(VBSS) for US Marines headed overseas. We have developed a Six Step Danger Area Transit training/Operations Plan for mariners intending to travel Horn Of Africa/Gulf of Aden waters.
Jim Burke VP, VGS 760.803.5443 james.burke@vetgovservices.org

[seamarshals]

Today’s shipping operators are faced with two major choices. Several organizations offer a “one size-fits-all” approach that is projected onto all vessels. There are two challenges with this approach. The first is that a plan that offers a reasonable expectation of success would be extraordinarily, and often unnecessarily, expensive. The second is that a more cost-effective approach may well account for the unique features of the transit, the vessel, the crew, its operation or the threats that the vessel may face. The second choice, which appears on the surface to be more difficult, follows more of a business approach in that it evaluates the activity in terms of risk and then develops safeguards based upon sound practices, methods that have proved successful in past similar instances, or that have a reasonable expectation of being successful based on the knowledge and understanding of the threat. This latter approach is used in business all the time, generally when examining new or emerging markets or business lines. As a result, one managers move beyond the terminology specific to the security industry, they should become comfortable with what is happening: (1) an examination of the goals to be achieved and assets involved, (2) an assessment of risk, (3) guidance made regarding the appropriate and acceptable levels of risk, and (4) the implementation of measures used to ensure that that risk can be monitored and maintained at appropriate levels. What needs to be clear in the mind of the manager, however, is that these are consecutive steps that trade a slightly longer planning cycle in return for the more efficient and effective use of resources. The maritime environment offers unique opportunities for those protecting the security of the vessel, and unique challenges. On one hand, the vessels being protected are generally disadvantaged in terms of size or speed when compared against smaller, more maneuverable craft. At the same time, however, the array of sensing technologies and routines aboard the vessel assist in it becoming a moving defense platform that can actually be used to manipulate its immediate environment to best advantage.

[seamarshals]

ISSG Holdings, Ltd. and Evolutionary Security Management, Inc. have developed an unparalleled anti-piracy vessel survey program for the maritime industry. This survey is conducted in two parts. First we send a trained security surveyor to your vessel, anywhere in the world to conduct the survey without interrupting the ships schedule. The report of the security survey is then transmitted to Evolutionary Security Management, Inc. in Canada, where an exhaustive assessment is conducted, and report issued back to the company.

Being appropriately prepared for an attack by pirates requires an approach that is based on sound judgment and analysis. The approach put forward in this program is intended to meet that goal while clearly demonstrating the company's alignment with Section 29 of MSC 1333 put forward by the IMO in June 2009 and other elements of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. While the IMO's guidance is indicated as being a preferred practice, it can be construed, given the maritime culture, as a best practice for companies seeking to demonstrate that they are exercising their due diligence. This approach is further supported by security doctrine that has undergone a peer review to ensure its soundness and consistency with security doctrine and practices.

Theory:
The three following cycles play pivotal roles in the defence of the vessel:

1. Protection, detection, response and recovery;

2. Deter, detect, delay, deny and detain or destroy; and

3. Mitigation, preparation, response and recovery.

In the first cycle, the goal is for the vessel to be able to be adequately hardened against reasonably foreseeable threats. Having been hardened, the next goal is for the vessel to be able to detect and respond to threats effectively. Finally, infrastructure should be included that allows for the vessel to recover from a range of known impacts.

In the second cycle, the focus is on the security operations of the vessel. In this case, the hardening of the vessel and other activities ideally deter the attacker. If this is not possible, however, the goal is for the vessel to be able to detect and delay the attacker from boarding the vessel (and progressively more sensitive areas) until help arrives. Finally, the goal is to be able to deny access to personnel , potential hostages, or critical aspects of the ship. Finally, the ship may want to maintain the means of being able to detain or destroy a potential attacker, although this option will rarely be acceptable.

In the third cycle, the goal is to take steps to minimize the potential impacts of an attack as part of the long-term corporate activities. The first cycle plays a significant role in the preparation of the vessel while the second cycle plays a significant role in the response phase. The final recovery phase ensures that the ship, its crew and the assets on board are protected so that normal operations can resume expeditiously.

The Approach:
There are four basic elements required in order to perform a valid survey of a vessel. These four elements are the following:

An understanding of the threat, including its knowledge, skills, abilities and traditional resources; ·

An understanding of the vessel from an engineering perspective; ·

An understanding of the operations of the vessel, particularly its navigation and how it deals with security events;

and · An understanding of the crew and its ability to respond.

Before setting out on the survey, the surveyor must review the threat profile of the potential threat in the area. Particular attention should be paid to the intent, number of craft, number of persons per craft, knowledge, skills, abilities, and resources (particularly weapons and tools) available to the attacker. This can often be provided through the Evolutionary Security website (marineweb). To get access to this web, you will need to contact
amcdougall@evolutionarysecurity.ca

The second element deals with how robust the vessel is or, in other terms, how well it is likely to withstand an attack. This is broken down into two sub-elements. The first element deals with the materials, engineering and design used in the construction of the vessel. This is a question of robustness. The second sub-element, however, looks at whether or not the design offers the attacker the means or opportunity to gradually penetrate onto the vessel, into the superstructure, and then to progressively more protected compartments.

While the second element deals with how well the ship can defend itself (a question of preparation), the third element looks at the elements of response and recovery. Having detected a suspicious vessel or potentially hostile situation, can the vessel outrun, outmaneuver, or otherwise navigate in such a way that it enhances the ship's natural design features? This is the first sub-element. The second sub-element involves whether or not the ship has the necessary preparations, plans, procedures and testing completed to validate whether or not the infrastructure on board the vessel is working.

The final element of four involves the training and understanding of the crew. This is not part of the ship survey and fits more closely into an inspection under regulatory regimes, etc. We want, however, to remind the ship owner and operator that technology is only one piece of the challenge, the other is a capable and confident crew. Incident reports have borne out the conclusion that those that have solid plans and look like they know how to execute them have a reduced chance of being attacked over those that appear unprepared.

We believe that the Vessel Survey for Anti-Piracy Risk Assessment is vital in the maritime industry today. This program not only enhances the capability of the ship and crew to be prepared, but is one of the most cost effective ways for shipping companies to exercise due diligence and a sound security practice.

[opksrj]

we assist clients with piracy issues - website is www.thorgdg.com

[theowl&theboa]

hello to all my shipmates and comrades in arms around the world, when it comes to maritime security remember this name: THEOWL&THEBOA INT'L SECURITY CONSULTANTS!!!! HAZE GRAY AND UNDERWAY!!!

[seamarshals]

It’s not just the pirates that you need to look out for. Consider this; the goal of your shipping industry is the movement of persons and goods to an intended destination on time, in the right condition, and for a reasonable cost. While the threat associated with piracy is reasonably clear, there are some side issues that ship owners and operators should be aware of. This is the first of three that we want to make sure that ship owners are aware of before they find themselves in challenging positions.

The first shark in the water is the unethical broker. The unethical broker is little more than an opportunist who causes damage to both parties in the contracting process. For the client, this begins with an exorbitant fee on top of the contract—sometimes as high as 25% of the gross. For the ship operator, this means that on a $100K contract for ship security, it can lose $25K just on this one step. Security companies, like shipping companies, are in this as a business. This means that the security company will make one of two decisions—reduce the costs associated with delivering the same level of service or increase the price. The former represents less value in the contract and less assurance that the ship can be protected appropriately. The second is a financial pressure that can be ill-afforded in the shipping industry.

This kind of practice might be considered reasonable if it was honest. It is not. Many represent themselves as actual security companies that are delivering the services directly.

The first way that these unethical brokers operate is to gather a number of bids from security companies and then inflate them all with a “service fee” or “professional fee” –sometimes as high as 25% of the gross value of the contract. In short, the bid that you receive may be inflated significantly from what you should be paying. The second part of this is that the unethical broker may actually be presenting bids from several different companies, deliberately manipulating the bid to put them all into the same price range. The end result, you pay a lot more than you need to.

The second way is for the broker to disguise himself as a security service provider. This is one of those half-truths. In these cases, the unethical broker will offer a low-ball cost and will then cast about into the security provider community to see if anyone is willing to pick up the contract. Of course, the individual communicates that the contract is worth so much after his or her cut is removed—offering the remainder to the company. The end result is that the client receives significantly less value for his or her dollars.

So what can a company do about this? There are some easy steps that you can follow:
• First, require that the total cost be broken down into itemized costs;
• Second, require that any work that is not being done by the person you are dealing with is clearly identified and require the ability to meet directly with any subcontractors; and
• Third, require that bids clearly and concisely communicate the total costs to you—or at least clearly list those items that might be considered “additional” costs.
These simple steps are intended to ensure that you are receiving value for your dollars. Credible security companies are willing to be reasonably transparent about what they are billing you for. If they are vague or evasive, take a cue from their investigations manual and demand a straight answer to the question.

There are, of course, times when a good broker is invaluable. This value generally falls into two categories. First, the broker can save a great deal of time in the search and vetting processes. Good brokers treat unethical security companies the same way that security companies treat unethical brokers—they stay far apart. Second, the good broker can also provide an indication of price ranges and other information that can keep a company from either being pillaged by a security company or accepting a bid that is “too good to be true” and likely to fail. The key here is to understand that they are both in the market and to make sure you take a few steps to protect your own organization from the unethical ones.

[seamarshals]

Escalating the Issue: Military Forces and Ship Escorts;

Risk management involves balancing the efforts associated with protecting an organization against loss with the potential for those losses to occur, if left untreated. What needs to be understood, however, is that security risk is only one kind of risk faced by a shipping company—we cannot forget operational, legal and other kinds of risks. The contracting of military forces changes this balance significantly.

When we look at the use of military forces being paid by private interests to provide these kinds of services, we are entering a minefield of issues. Before we explore some of those, it should be clear there may well be cases where the military, its government and the private sector have come to legitimate arrangements regarding cost sharing. What also needs to be clear is that, like many other risk management activities, companies should be exercising their due diligence before falling prey to the hype and pictures of flashy patrol vessels.
The first question that should be asked is whether or not this approach is actually legal. This has three parts. First, does this ship’s flag state condone this sort of arrangement? If not, then you run risks associated with being identified less favorably for targeting purposes, increased inspections and how the flag state generally views your company. The second element involves the nation involved. Does the government of the military involved have knowledge of and endorse the activity, or are you dealing with a situation where a senior official is using his or her influence to use government resources for personal gain? The third aspect is whether or not the use of an armed escort vessel is significantly different (from a legal perspective) than having the armed personnel on your ship. If your company cannot put armed personnel on board because the flag state does not agree with the concept of armed defense, will it view the hiring of a warship as an attempt to bypass its own controls and ability to administer its laws on your vessel? This will be a question for legal departments and, for the unfortunate, the courts to decide.

The second element is more pertinent to military forces on board vessels and near conflict zones. Remember, pirates are in it for the money. When you bring military forces on board, the question is not just whether or not you are a target for pirates but whether or not those forces are a target for their own various adversaries—be they terrorists or other militaries. This means that you have a new range of threats and vulnerabilities to consider, including how you treat approaching smaller vessels and so forth. For example, in the case of a potential suicide attack against a vessel, do you want your crew buried in the bowels of the ship or nearer to avenues where they can get to the deck and other areas to begin fire fighting or escape a burning vessel? This kind of scenario calls into question whether or not your security is truly risk based from an all-hazards approach or simply addressing current issues.

These kinds of questions are the kinds of questions that need to be going through the Company Security Officer’s mind when looking at these kinds of issues. It is not that it is likely, but security has to look at the broad range of possibilities and probabilities to ensure that management is well served.

Finally, you need to wonder about the priorities of the military. What happens if the military forces are recalled by their nation in order to defend it? Will the forces remain on board the vessel or will you be diverted in order to drop them off? If they are on another vessel, can they be re-tasked in order to deal with search and rescue, enforcement or other activities? These kinds of issues should also be clarified in any discussions and should be clearly documented both in terms of what assurances the company has and who is responsible for any costs associated with that action, up to an including the vessel being taken by pirates when the defenders leave.

Another issue, particularly with vessels operating outside of their territorial waters, is whether or not the vessel (and its crew) can be treated the same way as a warship or an coast guard vessel. It is, after all, now a government vessel being operated for commercial purposes—opening a whole ream of legal grey zones that the company would do well to have clarified.

All things being equal, there should be a level of effort made by the company to ensure that it is well protected legally when entering into these kinds of arrangements. While there are reputable companies providing security services (and potentially even these kinds of arrangements), there are others that will simply latch onto any opportunity to make a dollar.

This does not even begin to address the challenges associated with the issue of sovereignty or rights of innocent passage (including the restrictions). If the warship remains within its own territorial waters, we have more than enough indication to show that the pirates know how to shift locations to where the escorting vessels do not operate. At the same time, if they exit territorial waters and enter the waters of another nation, there could be issues (depending upon the international agreements with the neighbors and the levels of tensions between them) with a warship or patrol craft suddenly entering into that nation’s sovereign territory. If the forces are on board the vessel, then the matter is even worse. On one hand, the flag state may have issues with allowing foreign military personnel on board the vessel. At the other end of the spectrum, the vessel may be expelled from the waters under certain conditions for violating the conditions associated with innocent passage or may be subject to a range of enforcement activities.
None of these are conducive to conducting business when your business involves moving persons or goods from one location to another efficiently.

In short, know what you are getting into and ensure that you have verified any claims being made regarding the appropriateness of the service with the governments involved.

[kiwiglobetrotter]

Hi guys, I really enjoy reading your comments! I would like to ask a couple of questions. Where abouts are most security companies boarding ships etc? and where do they get off? I'm referring to the Gulf of Aden and off Somalia etc. I'm not from this industry but have an interest in how these Security companies operate to and from these ships. Cheers

[saint7i]

I am not sure if this email still serve any purpose since this reply comes more than a year late. This company, Saint 7 International Pte Ltd operates in Singapore and provides Maritime Security and Services for shippers and its community operating in SEA. Please visit www.saint7i.com for more information or email to info@saint7i.com.

Just spent the last 3 hours using the Google machine trying to find companies that specialize in piracy suppression or at least deal with it.
I know of Background Risk Solutions in Singapore and thats it.
Can someone shed some light on the various companies that are out there in particular SE Asia.

Thanks

[kinjo]

http://tactical-op.com/

[jim2175]

Just spent the last 3 hours using the Google machine trying to find companies that specialize in piracy suppression or at least deal with it.
I know of Background Risk Solutions in Singapore and thats it.
Can someone shed some light on the various companies that are out there in particular SE Asia.

Thanks

My company offers complete maritime anti-piracy services. The name of the company is Oasis Security Group, USA. We service SE. Asia and we are Global.

[jim2175]

www.oasissecuritygroup.com is who you need!

[fourtyseven]

Algiz Maritime Security <maritime-security@algiz.eu> or contact@algiz.eu


Adress emails to Caroline Gasc Ops Manager or Bernd Burger he is the COO

excellent and global